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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

“SPRING-LOADING” EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS: AN ABUSE IN
NEED OF A FEDERAL REMEDY

“Not the least misfortune in a prominent falsehood is the fact that tradition is
1
apt to repeat it for truth.”

INTRODUCTION
Securities regulation plays a central role in the governance of American
corporations. Responsibility for this regulation once fell solely upon the states,
as corporate governance was historically absent from the federal scheme.
Before the federal government ever passed securities legislation, the states had
been regulating securities transactions for over twenty years by way of “blue
sky laws.”2 By the time the first federal securities laws were enacted in 1933,
every state but Nevada had a securities statute.3
However, with that first federal securities act, the Securities Act of 1933,4
the landscape forever changed. Partly a response to the fraud that state
securities laws had failed to curb, the introduction of federal securities
regulation created a dual regulatory system balanced between the federal
government and those of the states.5 Moreover, the passage of time has seen a
steady growth in federal securities regulation, to the point that some view it as
unnecessarily overbroad.6 This argument became especially prevalent in the
1990s, when federal securities laws came to preempt their correlative state
counterparts in a number of key areas.7
1. Hosea Ballou, American theologian (1771–1852), quoted in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS
81 (George Seldes ed., 1960).
2. Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 111 (2004). These laws were “reportedly . . . aimed at
unscrupulous stock promoters who ‘would sell building lots in the blue sky.’” Id. at 111 n.14
(quoting LOUIS SLOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, 1 SECURITIES REGULATION 36 (3d ed. 1998)).
3. Id. at 111–12.
4. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006)).
5. Jones, supra note 2, at 111–12.
6. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
123, 125 (1998) (“An acorn of vague language in the 1934 Act gradually became the sapling of
equally vague but broader language in SEC Rule 10b-5 and finally a forest of federal anti-fraud
law, with a large grove of insider trading law. This process happened partly because of judicial
and bureaucratic incentives and politically powerful groups, and partly because the courts had
developed no clear guidelines that might constrain the growth of the law.”). Id.
7. See Jones, supra note 2, at 113–14.
629
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The National Securities Market Improvement Act8 of 1996 preempted
states from enforcing their securities registration requirements.9 In addition,
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act10 of 1998 prohibited the vast
majority of state law securities class action suits from being litigated.11 While
these preemptive laws altered the balance of federalism in securities regulation,
the states have been left still free to enforce their securities laws against
violators.12
Although many argue that the federal scheme reaches too far in scope,
federal securities regulation is going nowhere any time soon. The reality is
that the federal scheme has continued to increase with recent congressional
reaction to corporate scandal.13 Further, the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
and private parties have relied extensively on federal securities laws to curtail
corporate abuses.14 As a result, academic commentary has begun to look
beyond whether state or federal law should reign superior over corporate
securities dealings and to focus on the proper allocation of regulatory
authority.15
Assuming proper allocation of authority is a goal upon which many can
agree, questions then arise regarding where the proper balance exists. Can the
federal government simply pick and choose what it wishes to regulate, leaving
to the states everything else? Where federal law may not recognize a cause of
action for an apparently fraudulent securities practice, is it enough simply to
dismiss the matter with recognition that the states can enforce their laws
against it or that claimants may have a state forum for a breach of fiduciary
duty claim? Does an entity such as the SEC not have an obligation at least to
attempt enforcement through its rules, leaving interpretation of federal
securities laws to the federal courts?
When the federal government decided to become the main regulator of
securities abuses, it did not take responsibility for all “securities-related” fraud,

8. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
9. Jones, supra note 2, at 113.
10. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77p(c), 78(b) (2006)).
11. Jones, supra note 2, at 113–14.
12. Id. at 114–15.
13. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 953–54 (2003).
14. Most recently, this reliance has come in the context of the backdating of stock options.
See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1599 (2007).
15. Jones, supra note 2, at 108–09.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

“SPRING-LOADING” EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS

631

as the Supreme Court has noted.16 However, occupying such a central role at
least demands consistency. Consistency provides corporations with proper
guidance, investors with the notice and information necessary for informed
investment decisions, and litigants with appropriate expectations concerning
potential claims. Further, when a federal actor like the SEC seeks to root out
fraud through enforcement actions, it must enforce federal securities laws
consistently for these same reasons. However, for one recently-exposed
fraudulent practice, the SEC has done just the opposite.
“Spring-loading” describes the practice where a corporate executive
receives stock options shortly before the release of favorable company news
that is expected to raise the company’s stock price.17 It is a practice that uses
material inside information so that its recipient will receive stock options at a
lower, more advantageous price than if the market had knowledge of the
information. However, federal actors, most vocally the SEC, have failed to
recognize this practice as fraudulent. While the past few years have seen a
rush of SEC enforcement actions to regulate the once-popular practice of
backdating stock options,18 the Commission has been idle regarding springloading.
This fervor for action on the backdating front while remaining virtually
inactive on spring-loading raises questions that need answering. The
backdating of stock options is shaping up to be nothing more than a historical
footnote of fraudulent securities dealings.19 However, the SEC’s inaction and
implicit acceptance of spring-loading have likely invited more widespread use
of this practice.20 As a result, it has begun to promulgate the prominent
falsehood that spring-loading is benign and harmless. This reality begs the
question: in what major way do backdating and spring-loading differ?
While the backdating of executive stock options involves a clear case of
misrepresentation in that documents are altered to achieve instant financial
gain, the spring-loading of executive stock options is a less-blatant form of
deception. Spring-loading requires no alteration of documents. It simply
involves withholding market-moving information from the public while
executing a market transaction based on that very same information. Although
to many spring-loading smacks of deception, this difference between the two
practices may be a reason spring-loading has received less attention and why
some support its use.

16. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002).
17. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 918 (Del. Ch. 2007).
18. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1606–07.
19. See, e.g., id. at 1640 (noting that the SEC’s July 2006 disclosure rules “will almost
certainly eliminate clandestine backdating or forward-dating”).
20. See infra Part II.
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Regardless of the reason, an anomaly exists. Spring-loading’s supporters
count a recent SEC Commissioner among their ranks,21 while its detractors
include a Delaware Chancellor.22 Both are authorities on corporate law, yet
somehow they see the practice in opposing lights. Granted, one is a federal
actor, and one a state actor, but the difference lies beyond their respective
roles. Further, this difference cannot be explained by mere deviation between
federal and state law. Where one argues spring-loading “maximizes the effect
of . . . options,”23 the other has referred to it as “purposeful subterfuge.”24
Such comments strike deeper, more to an ideological chord.
This paper refutes the logic of spring-loading’s supporters, seeing the
practice as a deceptive and unnecessary form of executive compensation. It
views the SEC’s current position as spreading a false truth in corporate
America that spring-loading is acceptable. Part I briefly explains executive
stock options and spring-loading, charting the explosion in the use of executive
stock options during the 1990s that eventually led to the emergence of springloading. Part II examines the lack of federal enforcement to date, noting the
SEC’s implicit acceptance of spring-loading in its newly created disclosure
rules. Seeking consistency in federal securities fraud enforcement, Part III
analyzes whether SEC Rule 10b-5 is amenable to a claim of spring-loading.
Part IV examines recent state-level litigation, analyzing the Delaware
Chancery’s conclusion that spring-loading is a breach of fiduciary duty. Part V
takes the view that the federal government should step forward to regulate
spring-loading more strictly. To this end, it briefly examines a number of
remedies the federal government could implement to suppress the practice of
spring-loading.
I. THE EXPLOSION OF EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS AND THE ADVENT OF
SPRING-LOADING
In basic terms, an executive stock option25 is a contract that grants its
holder the right to purchase in the future a set number of shares of the

21. See Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Comm’r:
Remarks Before the Int’l Corporate Governance Network 11th Annual Conference (July 6, 2006)
[hereinafter Atkins Speech], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch070606
psa.htm.
22. See infra note 209 and accompanying text.
23. Atkins Speech, supra note 21.
24. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
25. This paper often uses the term “executive” stock option where it could use the term
“employee” stock option because the focus is on executive compensation, rather than that of nonexecutive employees. However, the terms at times will be used interchangeably, recognizing that
executive stock options are a subgroup of general employee stock options.
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employer company’s stock at a stipulated price.26 This price is often called the
exercise price, or “strike price,” and the option to purchase company stock at
this price lasts for a specified period of time.27 If the market price of a
company’s stock rises and its employee exercises the option to purchase the
shares, the employee receives a profit on the difference between the stock’s
market price and the lower exercise price paid for the shares.28 There are
numerous statutory and contractual limitations affecting when executive stock
options can be exercised and their alienability in general,29 but for purposes of
this paper, a basic understanding of how they operate is sufficient.
Stock options have been issued to corporate executives as a form of
compensation since at least the 1920s.30 However, despite their appearance
nearly ninety years ago, it was not until the 1990s that the use of executive
stock options truly exploded.31 This explosion was detonated with the stroke
of a pen, when President Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.32 Largely a response to outcry regarding what
many considered excessive corporate executive pay, Section 162(m) of the Act
placed a one million dollar cap on the amount of executive salary that public
companies may deduct as an operations expense.33 However, it exempted from
this cap certain categories of “performance-based” pay.34 Notably, stock
options meeting certain criteria were included in this category of performancebased pay and thus exempt from the salary cap.35
As a result of this exemption, boards of directors and compensation
committees came to view stock options as a means by which they could
compensate executives at similar levels to the past, without incurring a tax

26. Matthew A. Melone, Are Compensatory Stock Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZ. L.
REV. 535, 539 (2003).
27. Id.
28. See id. at 539–40. For example, if an employee receives 2000 options at a strike price of
$5.00, and then the market price of the company’s stock rises to $10.00, the employee can
exercise some or all of these options, paying $5.00 per share for stock that is worth $10.00 per
share. Exercising all 2000 options for $10,000.00 would give the employee 2000 shares of the
company’s stock, worth $20,000.00, which the employee could then sell on the market.
29. See, e.g., Jeremy Bulow & John B. Shoven, Accounting for Stock Options, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2005, at 115, 116.
30. John Calhoun Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 18 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 106 (1940)
(noting that the use of stock options to compensate executives “became exceedingly popular
during the 1920’s”).
31. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2003, at 49, 53.
32. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
33. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000); Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1620.
34. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1620.
35. Id.
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disadvantage under the new law.36 In 1992, stock options accounted for 24%
of an average CEO’s pay, with base salary comprising 38%.37 Remarkably, by
2000, stock options’ proportion had doubled, comprising 49% of CEO pay,
while base salary had declined to 17%.38 Even more striking, CEO pay grew
from an average of $3.5 million in 1992 to $14.7 million in 2000.39 This
quadrupling in average pay was largely a product of the massive increase in
stock options granted, which grew nine-fold, from an average of around
$800,000 in 1992 to almost $7.2 million in 2000.40
The position of prominence that stock options came to hold in executive
compensation led to large financial gains for executives in the bull market of
the 1990s.41 However, it was during this period of widespread use and a rising
stock market that evidence of opportunistic behavior began to surface. As
early as 1997, one empirical researcher, David Yermack, discovered abnormal
company stock returns following the issuance of stock options to CEOs.42 He
posited that this “pattern of abnormal returns [was] consistent with CEOs
receiving stock options shortly in advance of favorable news.”43 Yermack
thought this practice, not yet termed “spring-loading,” “seem[ed] to contravene
federal securities laws and possibly expose managers and directors to legal
liability.”44 He called it “a surrogate form of insider trading, albeit without the
ordinary requirements of disclosure or risks of detection and prosecution.”45
While this study hypothesized that CEOs influence compensation
committees to grant them stock options just before positive company news is

36. See Hall & Murphy, supra note 31, at 49, 53.
37. Michael C. Jensen et al., Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What
Are the Problems, and How to Fix Them 31 fig.3 (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 04-28;
ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
561305.
38. Id. The remainder of CEO pay was comprised of bonuses and other forms of
compensation. Id.
39. Hall & Murphy, supra note 31, at 51.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News
Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 450 (1997). Answering the possibility that post-grant-date
market fluctuations and corrections prior to the options’ exercise may mitigate any effect of
favorably timed grants, Yermack found that the monetary advantage of a favorably timed grant
becomes permanently embedded in the stock’s price. Id. at 450, 455–57.
43. Id. at 450–51. Among other results, Yermack found that earnings announcements after a
grant of executive stock options were more favorable than announcements before these grants.
Id. at 464. Further, the jump in a stock’s price was “markedly higher” for news announcements
following unscheduled option grants as compared to scheduled grants. Id.
44. Id. at 451.
45. Id. at 470.
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released,46 other research found that “executives have the incentive,
opportunity and ability to affect short-term stock prices by manipulating their
communications with the market around the time of [scheduled] stock option
grants.”47 One theory focused on the timing of grants,48 while the other
focused on the timing of the release of news around scheduled grants.49 But
despite the difference in focus, the basic premise of the theories was the same:
the propitious timing of executive stock options on such a consistent basis was
more than a coincidence.
However, although some in academia may have taken notice of this
research, it largely evaded the legal landscape, the SEC’s radar,50 and the
public consciousness until recently. It was only after Erik Lie’s article
exposing the practice of backdating stock options51 that stock option
manipulation gained notoriety.52 Exposure of the backdating “scandal” has led
to widespread action, including investigations by the SEC, the DOJ, the IRS,
and multiple state attorneys general.53 It has provided popular news media
with seemingly endless material upon which scandal-hungry audiences have
fed.54 Further, it was this exposure of backdating, placing executive

46. Keith W. Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock
Option Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 56 (2001) (citing Yermack, supra note 42, at 449–76).
47. Id. at 73; see also David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and the
Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73 (2000); Charles M. Yablon
& Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration:
A Case of Misaligned Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83 (2000).
48. Aboody & Kasznik, supra note 47, at 74.
49. Yablon & Hill, supra note 47, at 90. In a careful analysis, Professors Yablon and Hill
found that “all but the most egregious” manipulations in timing the release of news to influence
stock option strike prices were either legal or not subject to effective legal limitations. Id. They
found significant legal differences between pre-grant disclosures and post-grant disclosures. See
id. at 97–103. This paper focuses on the post-grant disclosures inherent to the term “springloading.” Yablon and Hill found more potential for a federal securities violation in these postgrant disclosures as opposed to pre-grant disclosures. See id.
50. The SEC has been at least marginally aware of such practices for some time, as former
chief counsel Peter Romeo commented upon the matter in 1999. See Timothy D. Schellhardt,
Options Granted During Takeover Talks Are Boon for Executives at Fore Systems, WALL ST. J.,
May 14, 1999, at C1. The comments came in response to Fore Systems, Inc.’s managers having
received 1,300,000 options leading up to General Electric’s acquisition of the company, which
provided the managers with over $26 million in profits when the company was acquired. See
Millionerrors Inv. Club v. Gen. Elec. Co. PLC, No. 99–781, 2000 WL 1288333, at *1–2 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 21, 2000). Romeo did not believe federal insider trading laws applied to the situation.
See Schellhardt, supra.
51. Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005).
52. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1599.
53. Id.
54. See id.
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compensation under a microscope, which finally focused spring-loading in the
radar of the public eye.
“Spring-loading sounds like[] the type of thing you ask your kids not to do
inside the house,” jested SEC then-Chairman Christopher Cox at a corporate
governance conference in late 2006.55 Another commentator remarked that the
term sounds “much like something from a diving meet.”56 These comments
are indicative of the general perception that many are confused about what
spring-loading is, not to mention its legal implications for corporations, boards,
and executives. Therefore, this discussion first warrants a clear definition.
The Delaware Chancery has defined spring-loading as “making marketvalue options grants at a time when the company possesses, but has not yet
released, favorable, material non-public information that will likely increase
the stock price when disclosed.”57 This definition is both clear and sufficient,
as it encompasses both (1) timing option grants so that they predate the release
of favorable information and (2) postponing the release of favorable news until
after scheduled option grants have occurred. A blatant example of this practice
is provided by Cyberonics, a medical device maker that on June 15, 2004
granted 150,000 options to its CEO only a few hours after receiving FDA
approval of its depression-treating surgical implant.58 When news of the
approval was released the next day, the company’s stock price rose seventyeight percent, providing the CEO with a one-day paper gain of nearly $2.3
million.59
Despite general agreement on what the practice entails, commentators
differ in their assessment of spring-loading’s legal implications. Observers
like former SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins view the practice as relatively

55. Eric Dash, Did You Hear the One About the S.E.C. Guy?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2006, § 3,
at 2. Cox also observed that “[b]ackdating sounds like something that you wouldn’t want your
daughter to do anywhere.” Id.
56. Justin Fox, Self-Deal? CEOs? Nahhh . . . , FORTUNE, Nov. 27, 2006, at 95, 96.
57. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 918 (Del. Ch. 2007). Spring-loading’s alter-ego,
bullet-dodging, involves granting options just after negative company news is released to the
public. See id. This practice achieves the same end result as spring-loading, as options are
granted at a lower strike price than they would have been otherwise. See id. Bullet-dodging may
raise similar legal issues as spring-loading, but views largely differ on this point. Compare In re
Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson I), 919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (speaking of bullet-dodging as a
breach of fiduciary duty akin to spring-loading and backdating), with Desimone, 924 A.2d at 944
(distinguishing spring-loading, akin to an in-the-money option grant, from bullet-dodging, where
the market has already absorbed the negative information and thus involves a strike price at the
stock’s actual market price). A thorough discussion of bullet-dodging and its legal implications is
beyond the scope of this article.
58. Barnaby J. Feder, Questions Raised on Another Chief’s Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2006, at C1.
59. See id.; Loren Steffy, Losing Credibility Not an Option for Most Companies, HOUS.
CHRON., June 14, 2006, at B1.
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unproblematic, even an effective means of executive compensation.60 Others
view spring-loading as a problem of corporate deceit in need of a remedy.61 In
addition, federal and state laws raise different legal issues, potentially arriving
at different conclusions on spring-loading’s legality.62
II. FEDERAL REGULATORY IDLENESS
Although spring-loading strikes many as inherently deceptive, some see it
differently. Then-Commissioner Atkins defended the legality of springloading in a speech before the International Corporate Governance Network in
2006.63 Atkins noted that even if a factual nexus can be established between
an option grant and the release of material inside information, the decision to
grant the options should fall within the business judgment of a board of
directors.64 Further, he asserted that “[a]n insider trading theory falls flat in
[the] context” of option grants since “there is no counterparty who could be
harmed by an options grant.”65
Atkins’s position that spring-loading does not violate federal securities
laws may lie behind the SEC’s virtual idleness on the regulatory front. It
remains unclear whether future enforcement action will surface, and much will
depend on the regulatory focus of the new chairman and commissioners in
place. Confusingly, the SEC has in the past sent mixed signals concerning its
intent. Where Atkins was vocal in his defense of spring-loading,66 thenChairman Christopher Cox once implied future enforcement actions.67 Cox
stated that “the SEC ‘is equally concerned with misbehavior in using inside
information to time the granting of options [as with backdating]’” and that the
Commission “will be very interested in . . . spring-loading.”68 Further

60. See, e.g., Atkins Speech, supra note 21.
61. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 888–89 (2004);
Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1639–41.
62. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 888–89.
63. Atkins Speech, supra note 21.
64. Id. (“For example, a board may approve an options grant for senior management ahead
of what is expected to be a positive quarterly earnings report. In approving the grant, the
directors may determine that they can grant fewer options to get the same economic effect
because they anticipate that the share price will rise. Who are we to second-guess that decision?
Why isn’t that decision in the best interests of the shareholders?”).
65. Id. (“The counterparty here is the corporation—and thus the shareholders! They are
intended to benefit from the decision.”).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65.
67. Jonathan Peterson, SEC Broadens Stock Option Investigation, L.A. TIMES, June 20,
2006, at C1.
68. Id. Taking the middle ground, SEC Chief Economist Chester Spatt said he “personally”
believes that companies should not practice spring-loading but that boards have a “proactive
responsibility” in this area rather than the SEC. See Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist & Dir.,
Office of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Staff: Economic Analysis
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confusing matters, the SEC initially pursued Analog Devices, Inc. for springloading, and a tentative settlement was reportedly reached stating that Analog
“failed to adequately disclose that it priced stock options before the release of
favorable financial results.”69 However, for unknown reasons, the settlement
never became final.70
Furthering its tacit approval, the SEC took no position on spring-loading’s
propriety while addressing the practice in its July 2006 executive
compensation reporting requirements.
The requirements mandate that
companies include a Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A) in forms
filed with the SEC.71 In the CD&A, a company must “explain all material
elements of . . . compensation of . . . executive officers.”72 The rules include as
an example, “depending upon the facts and circumstances,”73 that a company
may need to report “[h]ow the determination is made as to when awards are
granted, including awards of equity-based compensation such as options.”74
However, in its release adopting the final rules in August of 2006, the
Commission stated that:
The Commission does not express a view as to whether or not a company may
or may not have valid and sufficient reasons for such timing of option grants,
consistent with a company’s own business purposes. Some commentators
have expressed the view that following these practices may enable a company
to receive more benefit from the incentive or retention effect of options
because recipients may value options granted in this manner more highly or
because doing so provides an immediate incentive for employee retention
because an employee who leaves the company forfeits the potential value of
unvested, in-the-money options. Other commentators believe that timing
option grants in connection with the release of material non-public information
75
may unfairly benefit executives and employees.

In essence, the release clarifies only that the SEC is uninterested in
regulating spring-loading beyond requiring the disclosure of a “plan or

and Cost-Benefit Analysis: Substitutes or Complements? (Mar. 15, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch031507css.htm.
69. Kara Scannell et al., Can Companies Issue Options, Then Good News?, WALL ST. J.,
July 8, 2006, at A1.
70. Floyd Norris, They Deceived Shareholders. Who Cares?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at
C1.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b) (2007).
72. Id. § 229.402(b)(1).
73. Id. § 229.402(b)(2).
74. Id. § 229.402(b)(2)(iv).
75. Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 338732A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,163 (Sept. 8, 2006). One might question why the SEC goes to
lengths here to explain the “incentive or retention” effects of spring-loaded options, id., when
fully-disclosed, in-the-money options have an identical effect and involve no mark of deceit.
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practice” of compensating executives in this manner.76 While noting that the
existence of a spring-loading plan “would be material to investors and thus
should be fully disclosed,” the Commission stated that if such a plan exists,
“the company should disclose that the board of directors or compensation
committee may grant options at times when the board or committee is in
possession of material non-public information.”77 The rules do not require
disclosure of any material nonpublic information. They merely require
disclosure that a company indeed grants stock options while in possession of
material nonpublic information.78
Despite this reluctance to regulate, the SEC did investigate Cyberonics,
which granted 150,000 options to its CEO within hours after receiving FDA
approval of a medical device.79 However, after the new rules, it looks as if the
only SEC spring-loading enforcement on the horizon will be for a failure to
disclose such practices. Under the new rules, if Cyberonics would have
previously disclosed that it planned to act in the manner it did in the
furtherance of effective incentive and retention compensation, the SEC would
likely not consider the actions unlawful.
Although the SEC has not found that spring-loading violates its rules, a
strong argument can be made that it indeed violates SEC Rule 10b-5 and the
congressional intent behind federal securities legislation. If this argument can
be made, then in the interest of protecting the investing public and the integrity
of the markets, should the SEC not at least attempt an enforcement action,
allowing the federal courts to decide? To this end, one must analyze whether a
federal court could interpret spring-loading as a violation of Rule 10b-5.
III. SPRING-LOADING AND SEC RULE 10b-5
The only clear historical precedent for a Rule 10b-5 spring-loading claim
comes from an SEC action in 1968.80 In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the
defendants were company executives who possessed inside information that
their mining company had discovered substantially valuable mineral deposits
in eastern Canada.81 While in possession of this information, which would
eventually shoot the company’s stock price upward when released to the
public, the defendants accepted stock option grants from an unwitting board of

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(b)(2)(iv) (2007). It seems that a company may merely include
a statement in their 10-K stating something like the following: “In the interest of retaining top
executives, our most valuable company asset, we will grant these executives stock options
pursuant to a plan that is timed to maximize market incentives.”
79. See Feder, supra note 58.
80. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
81. Id. at 843–44.
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directors.82 The company’s stock price stood near $24.13 the day after the
options were issued.83 When the company released news of the substantial
mineral deposits to the public roughly six weeks later, the stock jumped to
$37.00, and it stood at $58.25 just a month later, an increase of over 140%
from the options’ strike price.84
The court held that by accepting the options while in possession of the
material inside information, the officers had violated federal prohibitions
against insider trading.85 The court noted that “[s]uch inequities based upon
unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as inevitable in our
way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern in the area, remain
uncorrected.”86 It required instead that corporate insiders with knowledge of
material inside information disclose the information to the public or abstain
from trading.87 However, since the directors had no knowledge of the
information when issuing the options, this holding is likely limited to a
situation where directors are unaware of the material inside information.
Federal courts have yet to address a federal law challenge involving directors
in possession of material inside information who granted options to officers
before the information was released.88
There is notable academic debate about whether spring-loading implicates
federal insider trading liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act, and particularly under SEC Rule 10b-5.89 Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act makes it unlawful for a person:

82. Id. at 844.
83. Id. at 847.
84. Id.
85. See Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 856.
86. Id. at 852.
87. Id. at 848. This notion was later altered to require disclosure only to those individuals to
whom the insider owes a fiduciary duty. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228–29
(1980).
88. Few private federal law claims alleging spring-loading have surfaced since the revelation
of backdating. The only notable spring-loading challenge came as a sidelight in the high-profile
backdating class-action suit involving Apple, Inc. See First Amended Shareholder Derivative
Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 4, 133, In re Apple Computer Inc. Derivative Litig., No. C 06–4128 JF, 2007
WL 4170566, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2007). The claim alleged a violation of state and federal
laws when Apple executives received over 2 million stock options the day before CEO Steve Jobs
announced a major deal with Microsoft. Id. ¶ 133. After release of the news, Apple’s share price
rose forty-eight percent in two days. Dawn C. Chmielewski, At Apple, Timing Led to Overnight
Windfalls, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A1. However, the defendants’ motion to dismiss was
granted on statute of limitations and heightened pleading grounds. See In re Apple, 2007 WL
4170566, at *5–8. While the decision focused almost purely on backdating, the statute of
limitations analysis looks to preclude the spring-loaded grant in relation to the Microsoft news for
Section 10(b) purposes. See id. at *5.
89. See Tyson I, 919 A.2d 563, 593 n.77 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citing multiple sources
highlighting the academic debate).
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[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . ,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
90
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

Pursuant to Section 10(b), the SEC established Rule 10b-5, which generally
proscribes any act that “operate[s] as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”91 The rule has been
described as a “long-arm provision in which the SEC forbids everything the
statute gives it power to forbid.”92
On its face, Rule 10b-5 may look to apply plainly to an act such as springloading, if only because the practice for many provokes notions of secrecy and
deceit, and because it involves stock options, which are at least directly related
to securities. However, a brief glimpse at Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence quickly
dispels any notion of an easy fit.
To prove a claim under Rule 10b-5, courts generally require five elements:
(1) fraud or deceit (2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or
sale (5) of any security.93 Of these elements, the second presents the least
room for argument regarding its application to spring-loading. The actors
involved are certainly people, whether corporate officers or members of a
board of directors. The other four elements warrant a more detailed
discussion.
A.

Executive Stock Options as “Securities”

The term “security” is defined in both the Securities Act of 193394 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.95 In defining a security, scholars have noted

90. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291 § 10, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)–78(k)(k) (1982 & Supp. V 1987)) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Rule 10b-5 states in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility or any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
92. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42
STAN. L. REV. 385, 463 (1990).
93. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.4[2], at 380–81 (4th
ed. 2002).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2006).
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that the definitional language between the Acts is strikingly similar.96 To this
end, the Supreme Court has held that the definition of a security between the
Securities Acts is “virtually identical and will be treated as such in our
decisions dealing with the scope of the term.”97
Few federal courts have addressed whether executive, or more generally
employee, stock options fall within the definition of a “security” under the
Securities Acts.98 However, the courts that have reached the question have
generally answered it in the affirmative, holding that executive stock options
are “securities.”99 In the Securities Acts, the definition of a “security” includes
“stock” among a list of items, and it then includes the “right to . . . purchase,
any of the foregoing,” directly implicating stock options.100 Considering this
clear inclusion of stock options in the statutory text, one available argument
that executive stock options are not securities utilizes the introductory statutory
language, which reads: “unless the context otherwise requires.”101 However,
courts have readily denied the argument that the context requires treating an
employee stock option as anything other than a security under the Acts.102
Further, although the Texas Gulf Sulphur court did not explicitly address the
definitional issue, it certainly must have assumed executive stock options were
securities; otherwise, it could not have imposed Rule 10b-5 liability upon the
defendants.103
Therefore, this paper moves forward with the assumption that executive
stock options qualify as securities under the Acts. The discussion now turns to
the remaining three elements: “fraud or deceit”; “in connection with”; and
“purchase or sale.”

95. Id. § 78c(a)(10) (2006). The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 will hereinafter be referred to collectively as “the Securities Acts,” or simply “the Acts.”
96. See Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and
Rule 10b-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 551 (2003).
97. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.1 (1985).
98. Robert Anderson IV, Employee Incentives and the Federal Securities Laws, 57 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1234 n.211 (2003).
99. See, e.g., Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 559 (2d Cir.
1985); Collins v. Rukin, 342 F. Supp. 1282, 1286–88 (D. Mass. 1982); In re Cendant Corp., 76 F.
Supp. 2d 539, 545 (D.N.J. 1999).
100. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(a)(10) (2006) (emphasis added).
101. Id. § 77b(a); see Bodie, supra note 96, at 558–59.
102. See Yoder, 751 F.2d at 560 (“We see no reason why ‘the context requires’ us to hold that
an individual who commits herself to employment by a corporation in return for stock or the
promise of stock should not be considered an investor.”); Collins, 342 F. Supp. at 1287–88
(“[T]he Court declines to hold that the instant context, as a matter of law, requires that the explicit
inclusion of stock options in the definitional sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts be disregarded . .
. .”).
103. This observation also holds for the “purchase or sale” requirement. See infra note 189
and accompanying text.
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Fraud or Deceit

Since executive stock options are legally securities, the analysis now
moves to determine whether spring-loading constitutes fraud or deceit in
connection with the purchase or sale of those securities. This section finds that
spring-loading may constitute fraud or deceit in the context of Rule 10b-5, but
the extent of disclosure required of corporations is largely unclear.
Supreme Court jurisprudence under Rule 10b-5 has developed the
“disclose or abstain rule,” which requires that an insider holding material
inside information must either disclose the information prior to trading or
abstain from trading until the information has been released.104 This rule was
originally articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur,105 and it was based on the premise
that the investing public at large is “entitled to equal access to material
information.”106 However, the Court has since scaled back the original rule’s
coverage. In Chiarella v. United States,107 the Court imposed a threshold
requirement that first there must exist a duty to disclose arising from a
“‘fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence’” before the
disclose or abstain rule applies.108 The Court reiterated this requirement in
Dirks v. SEC.109
The disclose or abstain rule forms the basis of the “classical theory” of
insider trading liability.110 The Court has also utilized an alternative theory in
holding a party liable for insider trading, known as “misappropriation
theory.”111 Misappropriation theory imposes Rule 10b-5 liability when a
person “misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”112 These
two theories are “complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on
nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of securities.”113
Some commentators have argued that spring-loading, at least where a
disinterested board is privy to the material inside information, is not a violation
of misappropriation theory, and therefore not a violation of Rule 10b-5.114
This perspective adheres to the analysis that although shareholders have no

104. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 860.
105. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
106. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 860.
107. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
108. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(A) (1976)).
109. 463 U.S. 646, 654, 657–58 (1983).
110. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
111. Id. at 652.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Larry E. Ribstein, Options and Insider Trading, on Ideoblog, http://busmovie.
typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/options_and_ins.html (July 11, 2006, 06:32 EST) (cited by Ch.
Chandler in Tyson I, 919 A.2d 563, 593 n.77 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
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knowledge of the inside information, they authorize the options grant through
an informed board of directors, and thus no misappropriation occurs.115
However, this analysis misses the mark, since it analyzes spring-loading under
the wrong theory of liability. The Court in United States v. O’Hagan116 plainly
acknowledged that the “classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of
duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misappropriation
theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate
‘outsider’ in breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of
the information.”117 Under O’Hagan, since the parties involved in springloading are corporate officers and directors and thus corporate insiders,
classical theory should be applied.
Professor Iman Anabtawi has analyzed whether under classical insider
trading theory corporate executives and directors can be found to have
breached a fiduciary duty when spring-loading.118 Under Dirks,119 the breach
must stem from “some manipulation or deception” in order to violate Rule
10b-5.120 Dirks followed Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,121 which held that
liability only follows from conduct that is “‘manipulative or deceptive’ within
the meaning of [Section 10(b)].”122 Thus, not every breach of fiduciary duty in
relation to a securities transaction is a violation of Rule 10b-5.123 As Professor
Anabtawi suggests, difficulty lies in determining whether spring-loading
satisfies the “fraud or deception” element because it is unclear where the
source of the fiduciary duty lies.124
Without knowing the source of the fiduciary duty, one can discern neither
what it includes, nor to whom it extends. The difficulty in determining the
source of fiduciary obligation is a product of the Supreme Court’s lack of

115. See id. (citing Larry E. Ribstein, Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 123 (1998)).
116. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
117. Id. at 652–53 (emphasis added). In O’Hagan, a partner at a law firm learned of a client’s
upcoming tender offer for Pillsbury common stock. Id. at 647. He purchased call options and
shares of Pillsbury stock while in possession of this information, thus misappropriating it. Id. at
647–48.
118. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 859–81.
119. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
120. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 862.
121. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
122. Id. at 473–74.
123. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
124. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 862. Anabtawi also notes the difficulty in defining the
element of deception. Id. For a brief discussion of the difficult and unclear precedent in defining
the element of manipulation or deception, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart Saved!
Insider Violations of Rule 10b-5 for Misrepresented or Undisclosed Personal Facts, 65 MD. L.
REV. 380, 385 (2006).
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clarity on the issue.125 In Santa Fe, the Court spoke openly against the idea of
a federal common law fiduciary duty because the “result would be to bring
within [Rule 10b-5] a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to
state regulation.”126 Despite the Court’s reluctance in Santa Fe to supplant
state corporate law with Rule 10b-5, in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan, all
decided after Santa Fe, the Court implied in its decisions a federal source of
the fiduciary obligation.127
1.

A State Common Law Source

State common law fiduciary duty principles include the duties of loyalty
and care. If an officer engages in a self-interested transaction, that officer
avoids violating the duty of loyalty as long as either (1) the transaction is
approved by a disinterested decision-making body—independent directors or
shareholders, or (2) if there is no disinterested approval, a court finds that the
transaction was not unfair, thus cleansing any blemish the self-interestedness
may cause.128 The state common law duty of care incorporates the business
judgment rule, “a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors
of a corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith and honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.”129 This rule
represents the “bedrock principle” that courts are reluctant “to substitute [their]
judgment for that of a board if the board’s decision can be attributed to any
rational business purpose.”130
In the context of spring-loading, disclosure is the key to fulfilling one’s
state fiduciary duty obligations.131 Under duty of loyalty doctrine, as long as
an officer discloses knowledge of material inside information to a disinterested
board prior to accepting an option grant, the transaction, although “interested,”
satisfies the duty of loyalty.132 In such a case, although the corporate officer is
interested, the transaction is cleansed by disinterested board approval, and the
officer will avoid liability. However, where a board of directors is interested,
two outcomes are possible: either a court will find that the transaction was
unfair and breached the duty of loyalty, or that the transaction was not unfair,
and thus not a breach.133 In the former scenario, both the officer and interested

125. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 862.
126. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).
127. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 863–64.
128. Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine, 85 OR. L. REV. 993, 1016
(2006).
129. Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1554 (D. Del. 1995)
(citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
130. Id. (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
131. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 871.
132. Id.
133. See supra text accompanying note 128.
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directors could face liability, while in the latter, no potential liability seemingly
arises. Potential liability attaches to the officer and directors in the “interested
board” scenario because “[c]orporate officers and directors . . . stand in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders,”134 satisfying the
fiduciary relationship requirement of Dirks.
However, even where an officer fully discloses the information to a
disinterested board, thus discharging that officer’s duty of loyalty, the
disinterested directors’ fiduciary duty to shareholders remains at issue.135 This
duty turns upon directors’ obligation to disclose certain information to
shareholders, often referred to as the “fiduciary duty of disclosure.”136
Professor Anabtawi has asserted that the honesty requirement established in
Malone v. Brincat137 commands that a board of directors must disclose the
material nonpublic information when communicating information to
shareholders concerning a grant of options138:
In other words, if and when a corporation, either voluntarily or pursuant to
applicable disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws, disseminates
information to its shareholders relating to the compensation of its executive
officers in general or option awards in particular, it must, in order to comply
139
with its state law duty of disclosure, do so fully and accurately.

This assertion looks to have been largely accurate in the eyes of one
Delaware Chancellor. Chancellor Chandler recently held in In re Tyson Foods,
Inc.140 that, in the context of spring-loading, where “a board of directors later
concealed the true nature of a grant of stock options, [the court] may further
conclude that those options were not granted consistent with a fiduciary’s duty
of utmost loyalty.”141 In addition, the business judgment rule will not protect a
board of directors that engages in spring-loading, because “[w]here a board of
directors intentionally conceals the nature of its earlier actions, it is reasonable
for a court to infer that the act concealed was itself one of disloyalty that could
not have arisen from a good faith business judgment.”142 However, the

134. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
135. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 868.
136. See id. at 870 (citing Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996)).
137. 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (“[D]irectors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to
exercise due care, good faith and loyalty. It follows a fortiori that when directors communicate
publicly or directly with shareholders about corporate matters the sine qua non of directors’
fiduciary duty to shareholders is honesty.”).
138. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 871.
139. Id.
140. In re Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson II), No. Civ.A. 1106-CC, 2007 WL 2351071, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 15, 2007).
141. Id. at *5.
142. Id. at *4.
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disclosure required by this Delaware case looks to be limited to the fact that
options were spring-loaded, and it does not likely require dissemination of the
actual material information.143
Therefore, under state law fiduciary duty requirements, when a board
communicates with shareholders, it must inform them of the favorable timing
of spring-loaded options grants.144 Since federal securities laws require a
corporation to disclose news of an option grant to the SEC, and thus
shareholders, within two business days of the grant,145 a board must disclose
upon filing the report that the grant was favorably timed in order to avoid a
breach of state law fiduciary duty.
2.

A Federal Common Law Source

If the Supreme Court continues to stray from the Santa Fe premise that
Rule 10b-5 should not be conflated with state law fiduciary duty ideals, then it
may more explicitly find that federal common law provides the source of the
fiduciary duty requirement of insider trading. Recall that Chiarella, Dirks, and
O’Hagan all hinted at a federal common law source.146 A brief look at federal
insider trading jurisprudence leads to the notion that the disclose or abstain rule
may provide the closest semblance of a federal common law fiduciary duty.147
There were two early justifications which led eventually to the disclose or
abstain rule.148 First, insider trading breached a fiduciary duty owed to
shareholders.149 Second, there was an inherent unfairness in utilizing
confidential corporate information, intended for corporate purposes, in
furthering self-serving ends.150 After years of application of the disclose or
abstain rule in the lower federal courts following the lead of the Second
Circuit’s 1968 Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, the Supreme Court finally
endorsed the rule in 1990 in Chiarella.151 In Chiarella, the Court noted that
“[i]n Cady, Roberts & Co., the Commission decided that a corporate insider
must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first

143. See infra notes 231–34 and accompanying text.
144. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 871.
145. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1627 (discussing the SEC’s amended disclosure
rules in line with Section 403 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act).
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
147. Theresa A. Gabaldon, State Answers to Federal Questions: The Common Law of Federal
Securities Regulation, 20 J. CORP. L. 155, 198 (1995).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 198–99. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961) (“A
significant purpose of the Exchange Act was to eliminate the idea that the use of inside
information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate office.”).
151. Gabaldon, supra note 147, at 199 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225–
36 (1990)).
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disclosed all material inside information known to him.”152 This clear
language citing an SEC decision certainly looks to indicate a federal source of
the duty to disclose or abstain.
Chiarella recognized that there exists a “relationship of trust and
confidence between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who
have obtained confidential information by reason of their position with that
corporation.”153 Further, “[t]his relationship gives rise to a duty to disclose
because of the ‘necessity of preventing a corporate insider from . . . tak[ing]
unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockholders.’”154 According to
Dirks, this duty to disclose is not a general duty, but one arising from a
fiduciary relationship.155 Therefore, shareholders are the ones to whom
disclosure is owed,156 although the Court has suggested that adequate
disclosure requires a broader, more public release of information in some
circumstances.157 The particular information that must be disclosed is
“material nonpublic information,” which describes “‘information intended to
be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone.’”158
Applying this framework to a spring-loading scenario, one must also bear
in mind the policy considerations behind section 10(b) of the Securities Acts.
The basic purpose behind the 1933 Act was to “‘substitute’ . . . ‘a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.’”159 In addition, a
significant purpose behind the 1934 Act was a “renewal of investors’
confidence . . . by a clearer recognition upon the part of the corporate managers
of companies whose securities are publicly held of their responsibilities as
trustees for their corporations.”160 Congress hoped that the 1934 Act would

152. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–27 (citation omitted).
153. Id. at 228.
154. Id. at 228–29 (alteration in original) (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp.
808, 829 (D. Del. 1951)).
155. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
156. Id. at 653 n.10.
157. See id. at 653 n.12 (citing In re Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 256 (1973)).
158. Id. at 654 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 933, 936
(1968)). The inquiry into whether information is “material” depends upon whether there is “a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). This inquiry involves a case-by-case factual analysis. Id. at 239.
159. Thel, supra note 92, at 415 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 186 (1963)). Some influential minds at the time criticized this full disclosure philosophy as
still too narrow. Id. at 416.
160. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 13 (1934).
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bring into “disrepute” the practice of an “unscrupulous insider . . . [using]
inside information for his own advantage.”161
With these purposes informing the analysis, it appears that an executive
must disclose material nonpublic information in some manner prior to an
option grant in order to discharge a federal fiduciary duty to disclose or
abstain. Without disclosure of some substance, the executive will have utilized
the information for his own advantage, something the 1934 Act sought to
prohibit.162 Further, this duty to disclose should reach as far as a duty to notify
shareholders of the material information prior to receiving the grant, or to
forego the grant altogether.163
Anabtawi has noted that the 1934 Act’s philosophy of full disclosure looks
to present the board with an obligation to “avoid making materially misleading
statements in connection with a securities transaction.”164 But it seems that the
disclose or abstain rule, in light of congressional intent, should take this
obligation a step further to include materially misleading omissions as well.
Candid disclosure is required because shareholders rely on board
communications regarding executive compensation in making investment
decisions.165 Further, shareholders generally expect options to be used as an
incentive for an executive to increase the corporation’s stock price, rather than
an in-the-money gift camouflaged as an incentive device.166 Still, assuming
the executive’s duty of recent disclosure is discharged by mere disclosure of
the information to the board, it remains unclear whether the board is required
under the “fraud or deceit” element to disclose the material nonpublic
information to shareholders prior to a spring-loaded grant.167 A true “disclose
or abstain” rule would demand as much. However, if the Supreme Court
instead grants deference to the SEC’s recent disclosure rules, a board would
need only to disclose the existence of a general plan to spring-load options.168
Thus, under a federal common law fiduciary duty to disclose or abstain, an
officer would need to disclose the material nonpublic information at least to
the board, and potentially to shareholders, prior to receiving the grant. If the
officer’s duty does not extend to shareholders, then the “disclose or abstain”
rule would require a board to disclose the material nonpublic information to
shareholders before granting the would-be spring-loaded options. Since the
SEC’s inadequate disclosure rules directly conflict with a true “disclose or
161. Id.
162. See id. and accompanying text.
163. Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 875.
164. Id. at 880.
165. Id.
166. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 820 (2002).
167. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 880.
168. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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abstain” rule, under a federal common law source of fiduciary duty,
shareholders should receive the material inside information before options are
granted.
3.

Synthesizing the “Fraud or Deceit” Element

Outcomes will differ depending on what body of law federal courts view
as the source of the fiduciary duty requirement. A state law source of fiduciary
duty would only be breached if (1) an officer failed to disclose the actual
information to the directors, (2) an interested or disinterested board failed upon
communicating with shareholders to disclose that options were spring-loaded,
or (3) an interested board approved spring-loaded options that a court later
found to be “unfair.” Alternatively, breach of a federal common law duty to
disclose or abstain would occur (1) if an officer failed to disclose the material
inside information to directors (and possibly shareholders), or (2) absent
officer disclosure, if directors failed to disclose the material inside information
to shareholders before granting the options. Unlike a state source, a federal
source would require disclosure of the actual information, rather than a mere
“plan” to spring-load.
In the end, the lack of clarity concerning the source of fiduciary duty of the
“fraud or deceit” element favors more clear-cut jurisprudence. Further, the
SEC’s allowance of a mere disclosure of a “plan” to spring-load is directly
contrary to the oft-mentioned “disclose or abstain” requirement of federal
insider trading jurisprudence. Whether the Supreme Court or Congress
delivers the clarity needed, the purposes of the original Securities Acts would
be served best if the “disclose or abstain” rule were adopted as the federal
standard. If this standard were adopted, disclosure of the material inside
information would be required before granting options, and spring-loading
would certainly constitute “fraud or deceit” under Rule 10b-5.
C. In Connection with the Purchase or Sale
Even if one accepts that spring-loading involves the requisite fraud or
deceit, the action still only violates Rule 10b-5 if it is “in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security.”169 The Supreme Court adopted a broad
understanding of the “in connection with” requirement in SEC v. Zandford.170
In Zandford, a securities broker sold securities in his client’s account and
seized the proceeds for his personal use.171 The Fourth Circuit had held that
the “in connection with” requirement was not satisfied because the broker had
merely stolen assets from his client rather than having manipulated a particular

169. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
170. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
171. Id. at 815.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

“SPRING-LOADING” EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS

651

security.172 However, the Supreme Court overruled the decision, focusing on
the fact that the broker made the securities sales so that he could defraud his
clients.173 While careful to recognize that the term should not be read so
generally as to “convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve
securities into a violation of § 10(b),”174 the Court stated that “[i]t is enough
that the scheme to defraud and the sale of securities coincide.”175
Still, there must be a legal “purchase or sale” of a security in order for the
fraudulent action in connection with it to matter for Rule 10b-5 purposes.176
The dividing line between whether a grant of employee stock options is a
“purchase or sale” or a mere gratuity seemingly lies on the fault between
broad-based employee option plans and options granted to high-level officers
in return for employment.177 The SEC stated in a 1980 release that regarding
“stock awarded to, or acquired by, employees pursuant to individual
employment arrangements, the staff generally has concluded that such
arrangements involve separately bargained consideration, and that a sale of the
stock has occurred.”178
Courts have welcomed this interpretation in a line of cases beginning with
Collins v. Rukin.179 There, the court stated that where an employee is induced
into employment through a “quid pro quo” involving the grant of stock
options, a sale of securities takes place.180 It distinguished between this type of
transaction and one where stock options are granted without consideration in
return.181 Following this reasoning, in Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nutrition
Institution, Inc.,182 the court could find no reason why “an individual who
commits herself to employment by a corporation in return for stock or the
promise of stock should not be considered an investor.”183 In Yoder, a food
allergist sold her business to the defendant and accepted a position of
employment with the defendant, while the defendant promised to grant her
stock in its company if certain sales levels were achieved.184 Such an

172. Id. at 817–18.
173. Id. at 820.
174. Id. at 820.
175. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 822.
176. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
177. See Bodie, supra note 96, at 560.
178. Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 6188, 1980 WL 29482, at
*15 n.84 (Feb. 1, 1980).
179. 342 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Mass. 1972).
180. Id. at 1289–91.
181. Id. at 1289.
182. 751 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1985).
183. Id. at 560.
184. Id. at 556–57.
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arrangement met the requirement of a sale of securities in the eyes of the
court.185
Even where stock options were part of an employment agreement with a
current executive, rather than an agreement inducing someone to employment,
the court in Campbell v. National Media Corp. held that the agreement
constituted the purchase of securities.186 Only where options are granted in
broad measure to large numbers of employees, such as in employee stock
ownership plans, have courts held that options fall outside Rule 10b-5’s
ambit.187
In light of these cases, a grant of spring-loaded options should amount to
the “purchase or sale” of securities. Such a practice does not involve a broadbased option plan. Rather, it is calculated to induce or retain the employment
of a select number of high-level executives. Further, under the Campbell line
of reasoning, no distinction is drawn between options granted to a current
executive or those used to attract a new executive. In addition, considering the
strong bargaining position of high-level executives, options granted to these
individuals are likely never granted without “separately bargained
consideration,” as the SEC once phrased the requirement.188 If not attracting
employment per se, they are a means of retaining productive officers, which
can often hold more value for a company than finding new talent. Finally, the
Texas Gulf Sulphur court imposed Rule 10b-5 liability for spring-loading, a
decision it could not have reached without the assumption that options satisfy
the “purchase or sale” requirement.189 Thus, one may safely conclude that a
grant of options to an individual or a small number of upper-echelon
executives constitutes the “purchase or sale” of securities under Rule 10b-5.
Finally, the question remains whether the “in connection with” element is
satisfied. Thinking logically, if granting executive stock options based on
material nonpublic information can be considered fraud, and if an option grant
to an executive constitutes the “sale” of a security, then the fraud and the
security “sale” cannot be separated. Under Zandford, the “scheme to defraud
and the sale of securities coincide,”190 because the action of granting the
options is both the fraud and the sale. More precisely, the action of granting

185. Id. at 561.
186. Campbell v. Nat’l Media Corp., No. Civ. A. 94-4590, 1994 WL 612807, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 3, 1994).
187. See In re Cendant Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (D.N.J. 1999) (distinguishing between
options offered to an individual versus options offered to a member of a group of employees).
For a thorough criticism of the individual versus broad-based option plan distinction, see Bodie,
supra note 96, at 568–77 (arguing that the distinction is unwarranted and illogical).
188. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
189. See Anabtawi, supra note 61, at 882 (“[W]ithout the benefit of that assumption, there
could have been no fraud ‘in connection with a purchase or sale,’ as required by the Rule.”).
190. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 822 (2001).
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the options while in possession of material nonpublic information is the fraud,
while the mere grant of the options is the sale. Phrased either way, the “in
connection with” element looks to pose no bar to a rule 10b-5 cause of action
for spring-loading.
IV. IMPLICATIONS IN DELAWARE
Although the SEC’s less-than-enthusiastic regulation of past undisclosed
spring-loading is the extent of federal action thus far, the Delaware Chancery
recently acknowledged a cause of action for spring-loading. In Tyson II, the
court held that the practice is a breach of the fiduciary duties of good faith and
loyalty.191 In its decisions, the Chancery provided guidance on how Delaware
courts may address future spring-loading claims. At the same time, it exposed
the weakness of state common law fiduciary duty claims as a remedy to curb
the practice of spring-loading.
In a shareholder derivative action, the plaintiffs alleged that Tyson Foods
directors granted spring-loaded options to the company’s executives on three
separate occasions.192 On March 29, 2001, Tyson’s compensation committee
granted a total of 350,000 options to three different directors at $11.50 per
share.193 The next day, Tyson publicly cancelled a $3.2 billion acquisition
deal.194 This news sent the company’s stock price to $13.47 by the end of the
day, more than a seventeen percent gain.195 Directors received similar grants
in October of 2001 and again in September of 2003.196 On these two
occasions, the grants closely preceded Tyson’s public announcements that
quarterly earnings would exceed Wall Street’s expectations, propelling the
company’s stock price upward.197 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that the
spring-loaded options amounted to unjust enrichment of their recipients,
entitling the company to disgorgement of the unjustly obtained benefits.198
191. Tyson II, No. Civ.A. 1106-CC, 2007 WL 2351071, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007). The
case settled in January of 2008. David Irvin, Tyson to Pay $4.5 Million to Settle Suit, ARK. DEM.GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 2008, at D1. The settlement requires a number of reforms, including public
disclosure six months in advance of the date when stock options will be priced. Id.
192. Tyson II, 2007 WL 2351071, at *1. Initially, four different grants were challenged, but
one was subsequently cancelled by the company and rendered moot. Id. at *1 n.5.
193. Tyson I, 919 A.2d 563, 576 (Del. Ch. 2007).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. Coloring the background of these allegations was a 2004 SEC investigation into
Tyson directors’ perquisites. Id. at 579. These gratuities included the undisclosed personal use of
corporate assets for the purchase of antiques, a horse, jewelry, artwork, and theater tickets. Id. In
addition, Tyson family and friends were allegedly granted unlimited use of corporate aircraft,
corporate vacation homes, chauffeurs, cooks, landscapers, and a boat crew, among other things.
Id.
198. Tyson I, 919 A.2d at 580.
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In a motion to dismiss, the court first held that the plaintiffs’ springloading claims withstood a statute of limitations challenge.199 The doctrines of
equitable tolling and fraudulent concealment both tolled the statute of
limitations, according to the court.200 The plaintiffs alleged that the directors
had knowingly issued spring-loaded options while publicly maintaining that
the options were issued at market value.201 The court noted that “[s]uch
partial, selective disclosure—if not itself a lie, certainly exceptional parsimony
with the truth—constitutes an act of ‘actual artifice’ that satisfies the
requirements of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment.”202
Further, since the defendants were fiduciaries, the doctrine of equitable
tolling applied even if fraudulent concealment did not. The court noted that
[i]t is difficult to conceive of an instance, consistent with the concept of loyalty
and good faith, in which a fiduciary may declare that an option is granted at
“market rate” and simultaneously withhold that both the fiduciary and the
recipient knew at the time that those options would quickly be worth much
203
more.

Since this alleged conduct was a breach of the duties of loyalty and good faith,
equitable tolling applied. Thus, the statute of limitations did not pose a
problem for the plaintiffs.
Moving to the merits of the claim, the court first dismissed the springloading claims against directors who were not members of the compensation
committee.204 Since the plaintiffs conceded that the compensation committee
had sole authority to grant the options, the claims necessarily were confined to
those individuals.205 Then, the court addressed the business judgment rule’s
application.206 Since the plaintiffs did not allege a lack of independence, the
court focused on whether the grants of options were within the bounds of the
compensation committee’s business judgment.207 To this end, the plaintiffs
needed to show that “the facts [were] such that no person could possibly
authorize such a transaction if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet
their duty.”208
In answering the question, Chancellor Chandler noted that spring-loading
presents a “much more subtle deception” than the “incontrovertible lie” of

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 590.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tyson I, 919 A.2d at 590–91.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 591–92
Tyson I, 919 A.2d at 592.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

“SPRING-LOADING” EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS

655

backdating.209 Focusing on what exactly shareholders authorize in an incentive
stock option plan, namely market-value option grants, the court recognized the
inconsistency in seeking shareholder approval of such a plan, and then seeking
to “undermine the very objectives approved by shareholders.”210 The duty of
loyalty held by a director includes “the duty to deal fairly and honestly with the
shareholders for whom he is a fiduciary.”211 These alleged actions fell short of
meeting the duty.
With the business judgment hurdle cleared by the plaintiffs, the court then
phrased the precise substantive question: “whether a director acts in bad faith
by authorizing options with a market-value strike price, as he is required to do
by a shareholder-approved incentive option plan, at a time when he knows
those shares are actually worth more than the exercise price.”212 The court’s
answer: “A director who intentionally uses inside knowledge not available to
shareholders in order to enrich employees while avoiding shareholder-imposed
requirements cannot . . . be said to be acting loyally and in good faith as a
fiduciary.”213
The court noted that two specific allegations must be present in order to
show that spring-loading is beyond the bounds of the business judgment of a
disinterested independent board.214 First, a plaintiff must plead that the options
were granted pursuant to a shareholder-approved plan.215 Second, a plaintiff
must claim that the directors who approved the options “(a) possessed material
non-public information soon to be released that would impact the company’s
share price, and (b) issued those options with the intent to circumvent
otherwise valid shareholder-approved restrictions upon the exercise price of
the options.”216 Having alleged these specifics, the plaintiffs had adequately
alleged that “the Compensation Committee violated a fiduciary duty by acting
disloyally and in bad faith with regard to the grant of options.”217
Turning later to the unjust enrichment claims, the court left open the
possibility that a claim of unjust enrichment could be proven on the alleged
facts.218 Since the spring-loading claims survived dismissal, directors on the
compensation committee now faced potential liability. Stemming from such

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 593.
213. Tyson I, 919 A.2d at 593.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. The court noted that shareholders may expressly empower a board of directors to
spring-load, bullet-dodge, or even backdate options, and that actions pursuant to such
empowerment would not violate relevant law. Id.
217. Id.
218. Tyson I, 919 A.2d at 602–03.
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liability, an unjust enrichment claim “would allow the Court to force other
directors to disgorge, for example, improperly spring-loaded options” from
non-liable directors or officers.219 The court could not rule out such a
possibility.220
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the outside directors of the
compensation committee filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.221
Clearing up a misconception at the time of the motion to dismiss, the court
now determined that the allegedly spring-loaded options were not incentive
stock options, but non-qualified stock options.222 This distinction was
potentially pivotal. Under Tyson’s shareholder-authorized stock incentive
plan, incentive stock options were required to be issued at market value, while
non-qualified stock options could be issued at below market value, at the
compensation committee’s discretion.223 The court had based the motion to
dismiss denial on the notion that the shareholder-approved stock option plan
explicitly required a market-value grant.224 Absent such an agreement, the
question had now changed. Perhaps surprisingly to some, the result did not.
Taking a step back from the question of explicit shareholder authorization,
the court returned to the comfortable terrain of the duty of loyalty. “The affairs
of Delaware corporations are managed by their board of directors, who owe to
shareholders duties of unremitting loyalty,” the Chancellor began.225
Loyalty. Good faith. Independence. Candor. These are words pregnant with
obligation. The Supreme Court did not adorn them with half-hearted
adjectives. Directors should not take a seat at the board table prepared to offer
only conditional loyalty, tolerable good faith, reasonable disinterest or
formalistic candor. It is against these standards, and in this spirit, that the
226
alleged actions of spring-loading or backdating should be judged.

Further, when directors seek shareholder approval for a stock option
compensation plan, “they do not do so in the manner of a devil in a dime-store
novel, hoping to set a trap with a particular pattern of words.”227 If the stock
option plan had never been put to a shareholder vote, the spring-loading
scheme would have constituted material information requiring disclosure when
the grant was made public.228 In consenting to the plan here, “shareholders did

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 603.
Id.
Tyson II, No. Civ.A. 1106-CC, 2007 WL 2351071, at * 1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 15, 2007).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998)).
Tyson II, 2007 WL 2351071, at *4.
Id.
Id.
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not implicitly forfeit their right to the same degree of candor from their
fiduciaries.”229
Looking to the two-part test it had applied in the earlier motion to dismiss,
the court held that, although appropriate at the time, it was “couched in too
limited a manner.”230 Even though the allegedly spring-loaded options were
non-qualified and thus could be granted below market value, the court was
“not convinced that allegations of an implicit violation of a shareholderapproved stock incentive plan are absolutely necessary for the [c]ourt to infer
that the decision to spring-load options lies beyond the bounds of business
judgment.”231 Rather, the court found that “where [it] may reasonably infer
that a board of directors later concealed the true nature of a grant of stock
options, [it] may further conclude that those options were not granted
consistent with a fiduciary’s duty of utmost loyalty.”232
Here, the court could reasonably infer from the pleadings that the
defendants intended to hide “a pattern of unfairly stocking up insiders’ larders
with option grants shortly before” the release of positive company news.233
Considering the lack of disclosure paired with the scale and timing of the
grants, an inference of “purposeful subterfuge” arose.234 Such self-dealing,
when accompanied by an attempt to hide it, was inconsistent with directors’
fiduciary duty of loyalty.235 Therefore, the directors’ motion for judgment on
the pleadings was denied.236
The court also noted that even with the appropriate disclosure, directors
would still be subject to a “well-pled claim that the compensation awarded was
actionably excessive because, for example, it involved self-dealing and was not
fair to the corporation.”237 This description resembles a corporate waste claim,
which involves “an exchange of corporate assets for consideration so
disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable
person might be willing to trade.”238 Largely a question of fact, it seems this
inquiry would pivot upon how extreme the difference is between an option’s
strike price and its market price at the time of exercise. Still, it seems that
waste might be an actionable claim in a scenario such as Cyberonics, for
example.239

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Id. at *5.
Tyson II, 2007 WL 2351071, at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *5–6.
Tyson II, 2007 WL 2351071, at *6.
Id.
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997).
See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
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In summation, the Delaware Chancery has determined that spring-loading
stock options can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. However, since the
court focused on the directors’ attempts to hide the fact that they had springloaded the options, the decision looks only to require general disclosure to
shareholders that a grant was favorably timed, or disclosure of a plan to time
option grants in this manner. If true, this requirement would somewhat mirror
the SEC’s disclosure requirements, a less-than-ideal result. Therefore, like the
federal forum, Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence thus far does not provide a
clear requirement prohibiting the use of material inside information to
favorably time an option grant. Chancellor Chandler may fall on the preferable
side of the ideological battle. But Delaware’s common law, at least in his
interpretation, does not require disclosure of material inside information before
options are granted.
V. SOLUTIONS
Identifying a problem holds inherent value, but it remains incomplete
without at least a brief look at potential remedies. As discussed supra, the
federal government has come to occupy a central role in securities regulation,
most notably in response to recent corporate scandal involving backdating.
The federal government then, in the interest of consistency, should take the
lead in remedying this problem, which closely resembles backdating’s
deception. Viable solutions exist that would provide this desired consistency,
ensuring predictable reliance by corporations, investors, and litigants alike.
Potential remedies include, but are certainly not limited to, the following: (1)
litigation under Rule 10b-5 or section 10(b), (2) new legislation, (3) IRS
enforcement, (4) monthly scheduled option grants, (5) a pre-grant disclosure
rule, and (6) shareholder approval.
Litigation under Rule 10b-5 is at least a tenable option.240 Although some
commentators still argue that spring-loading presents no problem at all,241 the
Delaware courts have determined that spring-loading represents a breach of
fiduciary duty analogous to backdating.242 This state law determination could
have significant federal impact from the standpoint of equating spring-loading
with a fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty, since Rule 10b-5 requires a
manipulative or deceptive breach of fiduciary duty.243 Additionally, some
commentators have noted that spring-loading could be treated as a violation of
the general insider trading terms of section 10(b).244 Arguments that the

240. See supra Part III.
241. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
242. See Tyson I, 919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (referring to backdating and springloading together as disloyal and an exercise of bad faith).
243. See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
244. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1641.
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federal government should refrain from meddling in traditional state corporate
law matters fall flat in light of extensive federal securities backdating
litigation. Therefore, since spring-loading looks to raise a viable claim under
federal insider trading laws, it should be tested by the SEC.245
If the courts determine that a spring-loading claim does not meet federal
securities law scrutiny, then an obvious gap in federal law will have been
exposed.246 In that case, Congress should attend to the problem that the SEC
has so far failed to fix. While the SEC’s July 2006 disclosure rules require
disclosure of a plan to spring-load options,247 scholars have observed that
while the rules “will almost certainly eliminate . . . backdating . . . , they do
nothing to limit springloading.”248 In effectuating an original purpose of the
Securities Acts, to renew shareholder confidence in corporate managers as
“trustees for their corporations,”249 federal law should address this practice that
legislators naturally did not consider at the time of drafting.250
Next, the IRS could enforce tax violations to which spring-loading gives
rise. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that for stock
options to be exempt from the $1 million executive compensation deduction
cap, they must not be granted below market value, or “in-the-money.”251
Further, under section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code,252 statutory
“incentive stock options” (ISOs) receive highly favorable tax treatment over
“nonstatutory stock options” (NSOs), subject to the same prohibition against
in-the-money grants.253 Finally, many executive stock options are NSOs
designed to be exempt under Section 162(m), and if deducted, these NSOs are
subject to 162(m)’s in-the-money grant prohibition.254
Since spring-loaded options are granted at a price that does not incorporate
the material inside information that will raise the stock’s market value, these
options must be considered in-the-money. Hence, they should not be exempt

245. Note that the SEC has at times hinted that spring-loading is a problem worthy of
enforcement. See supra notes 67–68, 79 and accompanying text.
246. With the current post-grant minimal disclosure requirement of Tyson, there is a gap in
Delaware common law as well. However, with federal law preempting most private securities
class-actions, the gap needs federal filling.
247. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1640; see supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
248. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1640.
249. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
250. The first and only true spring-loading litigation under the Securities Acts came to light in
1968, over three decades after the Acts were passed. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
251. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1620. Under section 162(m), to be deductible the
options also must be granted pursuant to a shareholder-approved plan, by an independent
compensation committee, and subject to a “per-person per-period” limit. Id.
252. I.R.C. § 422 (2000).
253. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1621.
254. Id.
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from the $1 million deduction cap, nor should they qualify as ISOs and receive
favorable tax treatment.255 Therefore, if a company has deducted the value of
spring-loaded options as a business expense under 162(m) or treated them as
ISOs, the IRS could institute collection efforts against the appropriate parties
owing taxes.256 Such enforcement could serve to curb spring-loading since
corporate and individual tax advantages would be forfeited.
Moving away from the penalty-enforcement front, the federal government
should also consider closer regulation of stock option compensation practices.
First, regularly scheduled, monthly option grants could largely eliminate the
benefit of spring-loaded options.257 For example, the benefit of a springloaded option in August will be counterbalanced by the higher price of the
options granted in September, since the market will have adjusted to the nowpublic information.258 Such a scenario would eliminate the incentive to springload options.259 Second, a pre-grant disclosure rule could similarly reduce the
benefit of spring-loaded options. 260 A pre-grant disclosure rule would require
disclosure to shareholders, shortly in advance of an executive stock option
grant, of the fact that the grant will soon occur.261 This information would then
be incorporated into the stock’s price by the market, and the options’ strike
price would more closely reflect their fair market value.262 However, a pregrant disclosure rule would still not prevent the manipulative timing of the
release of positive news just after the grant and negative news just before the
grant. Although the former looks to hold more promise because it more fully
eliminates the incentive to spring-load options, both regularly scheduled
monthly grants and a pre-grant disclosure rule could serve as practical tools in
limiting spring-loading.

255. Cf. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1621 (making the argument regarding backdated
rather than spring-loaded options). There are also potential implications under section 409(a),
which would create further tax burdens if options are considered in-the-money. See id. at 1622.
256. Some commentators have noted the difficulty in determining the “true” market value of
spring-loaded options on the day they were granted, presenting a potential problem for IRS
enforcement. See Kara Scannell et al., Can Companies Issue Options, Then Good News? – SEC
Is Divided on Practice Known as ‘Spring Loading’, WALL ST. J., July 8, 2006, at A1. However,
if the value can be determined, spring-loaded options could “come with the same tax ‘parade of
horrors’ that follows backdated options.” Id.
257. Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1640. Yermack also suggested regularly scheduled
option grants. See Yermack, supra note 42, at 454. In addition, he proposed not granting
options within a certain period around corporate earnings announcements. Id.
258. See Narayanan et al., supra note 14, at 1640–41.
259. Id. at 1640.
260. See Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through
Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 349 n.183 (1998).
261. See id.
262. See id.
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The final—and potentially most obvious—solution is requiring shareholder
approval. If a company wishes to spring-load options, nothing prohibits it
from seeking express authorization from its shareholders. Under federal
securities laws, such authorization would satisfy “disclose or abstain”
requirements and erase some of the inferences of manipulation and deception.
Further, it would effectuate more closely a purpose of the Securities Acts to
provide full disclosure and renew investor confidence.263 Under state
corporate laws, shareholder authorization would conform to the duties of care
and good faith held by directors. Therefore, a federal rule requiring
shareholder approval of spring-loading could be the best solution of all.
Although there is no “silver bullet” solution to the problem of springloading, there are many potential avenues by which the practice could be
largely eliminated. However, whether the answer involves enforcing existing
laws, codifying new laws, or more closely regulating option-based
compensation, the federal government should act to end this deceptive
practice.
CONCLUSION
The federal government’s central and largely preemptive role in regulating
securities transactions comes with an obligation to police and limit securities
abuses. However, if the federal securities laws are “designed to protect
shareholders from trading on incomplete or inaccurate information,”264 then
the SEC is failing this goal in regard to spring-loading. Federal inaction runs
the risk of perpetuating and repeating for truth the prominent falsehood that
former Commissioner Atkins and others endorse—that spring-loading is an
acceptable and efficient compensation practice.
On the federal front, spring-loading looks to satisfy the major elements of a
Rule 10b-5 claim. It does depend upon the source of fiduciary duty involved,
but under a true “disclose or abstain” rule, disclosure of material inside
information should be disseminated to shareholders before options are granted.
Absent such disclosure, directors, and potentially executives, will have run
afoul of Rule 10b-5 and should face liability. However, the SEC’s reluctance
to enforce federal insider trading prohibitions against spring-loading, paired

263. David Yermack disagrees. He wrote that “[e]ven if stockholders acquiesced in the
opportunistic timing of CEO stock option awards, considering it an implicit form of
compensation, such arrangements would contravene the spirit and possibly the letter of the
federal securities laws.” See Yermack, supra note 42, at 471.
264. Yablon & Hill, supra note 47, at 92. Yablon and Hill note that “[t]here is much
language in the debates prior to passage of those statutes and in later case law to the effect that the
federal securities laws were designed to prevent the kinds of abuses of naive investors that took
place during that period.” Id. at 92 n.36.
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with its tacit approval of the practice, have thus far stifled the possibility of
regulatory action under federal securities laws.
At the state level, the Delaware Chancery has determined that springloading constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty. This determination should alert
directors to potential liability, regardless of the federal implications. However,
it looks as though Delaware law merely requires disclosure of the fact that
options were spring-loaded after the grant has already taken place in order for
directors to discharge their fiduciary duty to shareholders. Thus, Delaware
common law, and likely the common law of most other states, fails to provide
an adequate remedy.
Therefore federal enforcement and reform are necessary in order to curb
spring-loading’s continuation. There exist many potential cures, including
litigation and enforcement under existing federal securities laws; passage of
new legislation; a regularly scheduled, monthly option grant requirement; a
pre-grant disclosure requirement; and simple shareholder approval. With
manifold possibilities, the only real obstacle to a solution is reluctance. A new
presidential administration now controls, and a different SEC chairman sits at
the helm.265 Amidst widespread public outcry against abuses and excess in
executive compensation,266 the time is ripe for a solution. If federal authorities
and legislators miss the mark, then the practice of spring-loading will persist.
If these actors rise to meet their responsibilities, however, then spring-loading
will fade in stature to represent little more than a colorful corporate buzzword
of the past.
MATTHEW E. ORSO
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